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SUCCESSFUL REFORM LITIGATION: THE SHAKMAN
PATRONAGE CASE
C. RICHARD JOHNSON*
The history of the long-running Shakman federal patronage litiga-
tion' demonstrates two important points about litigation that seeks sys-
temic changes in governmental structures or policies. On the one hand,
the success of the case in reducing the impact of coercive patronage prac-
tices on the electoral system in Chicago and Cook County, Illinois, dem-
onstrates that well-constructed judicial relief can be exceptionally
effective in dealing even with long-standing and deeply ingrained govern-
mental abuses. Indeed, the relief obtained in Shakman has led to a dra-
matic opening of opportunity in electoral politics in Cook County,
resulting in a significant increase in the vigor of local political competi-
tion. Defendants themselves have acknowledged that the case has
brought about a "revolution" in local political life.
On the other hand, however, the case further demonstrates that
courts which are reluctant to interfere with historic and systemic prac-
tices have a ready array of procedural reasons to exclude such claims
from review. The Seventh Circuit, which in 1970 upheld the standing of
plaintiff independent candidates and voters in Shakman to challenge pa-
tronage practices generally, in 1987 changed course and ruled that the
same plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge defendants' patronage hiring
practices. Ironically, the court's change of course may well have resulted
in part from the very success of the relief granted in the case in prohibit-
ing patronage firings. That relief made the injury from patronage hiring
seem less substantial.
The change in outcome on the standing issue at successive stages of
the Shakman case demonstrates the bellwether nature of the standing
doctrine on the willingness of the judiciary to consider challenges to gov-
ernmental policies. The outcome of the standing issue is especially im-
portant in so-called reform litigation, which focuses on practices with a
broad public impact. In some cases that public impact is more obvious
than any individualized injury.
* Partner, Schiff Hardin & Waite, Chicago, Illinois. A.B. 1962, Ripon College; J.D. 1965,
University of Chicago. Mr. Johnson was one of the lawyers for plaintiffs in the Shakman case.
1. The history of the case is set forth at 829 F.2d 1387 (7th Cir. 1987), rev'g 310 F. Supp. 1398
(N.D. Ill. 1969).
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I. LEGAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND FOR THE SHAKMAN
PATRONAGE CASE
The Shakman case was filed in 1969. It followed a series of major
decisions by the United States Supreme Court which evidenced the
Court's determination to eliminate state impediments to a free and fair
electoral process. For instance, in Baker v. Carr2 the Supreme Court
ruled that challenges to state legislative apportionment were justiciable.
The Court held that voters who allege facts showing disadvantage to
themselves as individuals from malapportionment have standing to sue.3
The Court set forth the test for standing as whether plaintiffs allege
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions[.] This is the gist of the question of standing. 4
Baker was followed by Reynolds v. Sims5 which adopted the one person,
one vote rule. As the Court ruled in Reynolds,
each and every citizen has an inalienable right to full and effective par-
ticipation in the political processes of his State's legislative bodies.
6
In a further set of cases in the 1960s, the Supreme Court also held
that the fourteenth amendment forbids states from unfairly inhibiting
political competition through methods such as establishing onerous bal-
lot access requirements. In Williams v. Rhodes,7 the Court stated that
overly difficult ballot access restraints violated both equal protection and
first amendment rights:
In the present situation the state laws place burdens on two differ-
ent, although overlapping, kinds of rights-the rights of individuals to
associate for the advancement of political beliefs, and the right of qual-
ified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their votes
effectively. Both of these rights, of course, rank among our most pre-
cious freedoms. We have repeatedly held that the. freedom of associa-
tion is protected by the First Amendment. And of course this freedom
protected against federal encroachment by the First Amendment is en-
titled under the Fourteenth Amendment to the same protection from
infringement by the States.8
And in Moore v. Ogilvie,9 the Court struck down an Illinois law that
required independent candidates to secure petition signatures from citi-
2. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
3. Id. at 206.
4. Id. at 204.
5. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
6. Id. at 565.
7. 393 U.S. 23 (1969).
8. Id. at 30-31.
9. 394 U.S. 814 (1969).
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zens in at least half the counties of the state, again on the basis of the
equal protection clause. In so doing, the Court stated that
all procedures used by a state as an integral part of the election process
must pass muster against the charges of discrimination or of abridge-
ment of the right to vote.
It [the Illinois statute], therefore, lacks the equality to which the
exercise of political rights is entitled under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 10
During the late 1960s, Chicago and Cook County were hardly ex-
amples of a competitive political system in which all candidates and vot-
ers had rights to "full and effective participation in the political process."
Power was intensely concentrated in the regular Democratic party or-
ganization. There was no effective political opposition or competition.
There was only one opposition alderman in the fifty member City Coun-
cil, and candidates of the regular Democratic organization won virtually
every election conducted county-wide or in the city of Chicago. There
were a variety of reasons for this unusual concentration of governance,
including the political skill of Mayor Daley. One of the most important
tools used to maintain such a noncompetitive political system was, how-
ever, the massive Democratic patronage employment system.
II. THE PATRONAGE CASE
Patronage control of public employment has been a chief character-
istic of Chicago and Cook County politics for at least half a century. The
Shakman case involves a comprehensive constitutional challenge to those
patronage practices. The case was brought in 1969 in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois by Michael L.
Shakman, a candidate for Illinois' Constitutional Convention of 1970,
and by Paul M. Lurie, one of his voter-supporters. They brought their
case individually and on behalf of the classes of independent candidates
for public office in Cook County (that is, candidates who were not the
candidates of the "regular" organization of a political party) and their
voter-supporters. They alleged that the patronage employment system
that prevailed in Cook County unfairly tilted the electoral scales in favor
of the regular Democratic organization and its candidates and thus
abridged the constitutional rights of independent candidates and their
voter-supporters to equal protection of the law in the electoral process
and to first amendment freedoms of speech and association.
The defendants in the case included many of the major public em-
10. Id. at 818-19.
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ployers in Cook County, including the City of Chicago and its Mayor,
the Chicago Park District, and the various other elected officers of Cook
County. The Democratic Party County Central Committee for Cook
County a party organization, was also a defendant.
The complaint alleged that obtaining and maintaining jobs with the
defendant public employers was based on active political support for a
single favored political faction, the Cook County regular Democratic or-
ganization. Usually, it was necessary for an applicant to obtain the rec-
ommendation, called "sponsorship," of a ward or township party
committeeman, in order to get one of these Democratic patronage jobs.
Sponsorship, in turn, required the applicant to perform precinct work or
to make financial contributions (typically a percentage of the worker's
governmental salary) to the ward or township organization and its candi-
dates for public office. Similarly, in order to be sure to keep the job, the
employee had to stay in the good graces of the political sponsor.
Failure to provide continuing political support for the sponsoring
official-in some cases measured by the actual vote total in the pre-
cinct-could cost the patronage worker the job.lI In the special patois of
the patronage system, politically discharged workers were said to be
"viced"; this term apparently derived from the form of the letter used to
sponsor replacement patronage appointees who were sponsored vice (in-
stead of) the fired employee. Conversely, it was common for employees
to avoid being fired for poor job performance because of the support of
their political sponsor. Public employment was thus maintained for the
benefit of the political party, rather than for the benefit of the public.
The scale of the system was massive. There were up to 40,000 Dem-
ocratic patronage jobs in Cook County. The patronage employment sys-
tem was alleged to have resulted in a substantial disadvantage to
independent candidates and voters. The system produced a large polit-
ical treasury, as well as a virtual army of precinct workers, for the benefit
of candidates of the Cook County regular Democratic political organiza-
tion. Typically, patronage employees had to return two percent of their
salaries to the sponsoring regular Democratic organization, as well as to
provide precinct political work.
Precinct work and financial contributions are very important factors
in electoral outcomes. Precinct work is especially significant in low-visi-
11. Strikingly, a case called just before Shakman at one of the many court calls in the patronage
litigation involved the sentencing of a precinct worker for vote fraud. He testified that he committed
the fraud because he was afraid that otherwise he would lose his patronage job. The patronage
system is a major factor in vote fraud. Vote fraud is, of course, more understandable as the result of
political workers wanting to obtain or retain jobs, than as a result of an excess of ideological zeal.
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bility elections. Accordingly, the patronage system gave officially fa-
vored candidates a massive, government-funded electioneering advantage
over independent candidates and voters who did not have the benefit of
that coerced political support. The particular election in which Mr.
Shakman was a candidate, for delegate to Illinois' 1970 Constitutional
Convention, illustrated the effect of the patronage system on electoral
outcomes. Out of over 40,000 votes cast, Mr. Shakman lost the election
by about 500 votes, a number of votes considerably fewer than the
number of patronage employees in his district. Patronage workers re-
ported that they could not support Mr. Shakman because it would jeop-
ardize their jobs. This extensive patronage system was alleged to have
been instrumental in producing the overwhelming and self-perpetuating
dominance of the regular Democratic organization.
Plaintiffs also alleged that the patronage system abridged their first
amendment rights of speech and association. Because the system utilized
the coercive power of the state to dissuade those persons who had or who
might want patronage jobs from supporting independent candidates,
those candidates' and voters' rights of political association and speech
were abridged.
The case was initially assigned to Judge Abraham Marovitz, a for-
mer Illinois state senator who had been active in the Chicago regular
Democratic organization. Judge Marovitz dismissed the case on the
ground that plaintiffs lacked standing as candidates and voters to chal-
lenge the patronage employment system, and that standing lay only with
the affected employees themselves. 12
A. The Initial Decision of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit reversed. 13 Judge Thomas E. Fairchild of Wisconsin (a state without
a tradition of patronage) wrote the majority opinion. The Seventh Cir-
cuit's decision had three basic holdings. First, it held that plaintiffs had
standing to bring the case, since the patronage employment system alleg-
edly resulted in a massive electioneering advantage for the regular Demo-
cratic organization, with a corresponding disadvantage to competing
candidates and their voter-supporters.14
Second, the court held that plaintiffs had stated a claim upon which
relief could be granted. Analyzing the case principally from the perspec-
12. Shakman v. Democratic Org., 310 F. Supp. 1398 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
13. 435 F.2d 267 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 909 (1971).
14. Id. at 269 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
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tive of the equal protection clause, the court held that candidates and
voters have a right to an equal chance and an equal voice in elections,
free from substantial state-created inequalities. In this regard, the court
relied on the Supreme Court precedents of the 1960s discussed above,
and applied the equal protection clause to the campaign aspects of the
electoral process. 15
Finally, the court observed that public employees have the same
right as anybody else to engage or not to engage in lawful political activ-
ity, absent any Hatch Act-type statute applicable equally to all political
factions. This holding was especially significant, for while numerous
Supreme Court cases had indicated that the states may not constitution-
ally condition public employment upon political orthodoxy, 16 Shakman
was the first case that applied this basic principle to the long-standing
and far more prevalent practice of conditioning public jobs upon support
of a favored political party or faction.
1 7
B. The 1972 Consent Decree
Upon remand to the district court, plaintiffs filed extensive discov-
ery requests concerning the operation of the Cook County Democratic
patronage system. These included a subpoena for the deposition of
Mayor Daley's secretary at the Democratic Party County Central Com-
mittee (of which Mayor Daley was Chairman). The day before the secre-
tary's deposition was scheduled, counsel for the Central Committee
indicated to plaintiffs that it would be desirable for the parties to discuss
the case with a view towards a less adversarial posture. There then began
an extraordinarily intense period of negotiations aimed towards a settle-
ment of the case. It appeared that Mayor Daley and other key defend-
ants did not believe that a defense of the practice of political firings was
tenable. Some, including Mayor Daley, may even have thought the prac-
tice politically troublesome or, in some cases, unjust. However, the prac-
tice of tying hiring to political support was too important to the party
15. See Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968); Reyn-
olds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). Since 1970, the United
States Supreme Court has also applied the equal protection analysis to electioneering activities. See
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
16. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 383 U.S. 589 (1967); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell,
330 U.S. 100 (1949); see also Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191-92 (1952) ("Congress could
not enact a regulation providing that no Republican, Jew or Negro shall be appointed to public
office.").
17. Subsequently, in Illinois State Employee's Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 928 (1973), the Seventh Circuit held that patronage firings violate the constitu-
tional rights of the discharged employees. In 1976, the United States Supreme Court similarly ruled
that political firings were unconstitutional. Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
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organization to give up by agreement. So only a partial settlement of the
case was able to be reached.
A set of basic principles was drafted which stated that once hired, an
employee would be free from political coercion, and that no political
work would take place on public time. The practice of political hiring
was left for continued litigation in the case. A meeting of the Demo-
cratic Party County Central Committee was held and the short statement
of principles was approved.' 8 A consent decree was prepared to embody
this agreement. The decree provided for a permanent injunction forbid-
ding "conditioning, basing or knowingly affecting any term or aspect of
governmental employment, with respect to one who is at the time already
a governmental employee, upon or because of any political reason or
factor." 19
The injunction applies to all nonfederal public employment within
the territory of the Federal District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois. The injunction is binding on the City of Chicago, most elective
officers of Cook County, the Democratic County Central Committee,
and on any of their successors, present or future members, officers,
agents, employees, and anyone with notice of the decree who acts in ac-
tive concert with anyone named or referred to in it.20
The decree is not limited to political firings. Rather, it applies to
any kind of employment decision with respect to a person once hired.
The decree thus applies to firings, demotions, transfers, suspensions, har-
assment and failures to give or consider employees for promotions. And
it adopts a clear rule: politics is simply not to be taken into account with
regard to any of the actions. The consent decree provides that any regis-
tered voter may apply to the district court to enforce or seek relief for
violation of the injunction. The decree is thus to be enforced through
individual actions brought by affected persons themselves. By establish-
ing a "bright line" rule forbidding all political factors from affecting em-
ployment, public officials are given clear guidance as to compliance with
the decree.
The consent decree did not, however, settle all of the issues in the
case. It specifically provided that the court would retain jurisdiction to
determine:
a) What employment positions should be exempt from the provi-
sions of the decree;
18. The fact that this action was taken by the Central Committee illustrated that it was the
party organization which essentially ran the governmental employment system.
19. Judgment at para. E, Shakman (No. 69 C 2145).
20. See FED. R. Civ. P. 65(1).
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b) Whether defendants' political hiring practices violated plaintiffs'
rights; and
c) What further orders and direction would be necessary to carry
out the judgment.
2'
The original Democratic defendants, wishing to avoid unilateral dis-
armament, conditioned their agreement to entry of the decree upon
plaintiffs obtaining similar injunctive relief against the Governor and Sec-
retary of State of Illinois. Plaintiffs accordingly modified their complaint
to include these statewide offices, then held by Republicans, who, after
further negotiations, also agreed to be bound by the decree.
The district court approved this partial settlement of the case and on
May 5, 1972, entered the consent decree. Subsequently, additional de-
fendants, including the patronage-rich Chicago Park District, added
when the state offices were brought into the case, also joined in the con-
sent decree. The decree thus now binds nearly all state, Cook County
and City of Chicago public employers within the territory of the District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois. It protects over 100,000 pub-
lic employees.
C. Enforcement and Effectiveness of the 1972 Consent Decree
It is undisputed that the 1972 consent decree has been quite effective
in reducing the degree of political coercion on patronage employees, and
in opening the political process to vigorous competition. These results
did not come without considerable effort, however. For example, in 1975
Congressman Ralph Metcalfe (the Democratic Ward Committeeman for
Chicago's Third Ward and the sponsor for the ward's patronage work-
ers) refused to endorse Mayor Daley for reelection and declined to organ-
ize the circulation of his petitions for candidacy. City officials then
promptly summoned many of Representative Metcalfe's sponsored pa-
tronage employees to City Hall and told them that they were to support
Mayor Daley, forcefully directing them to circulate petitions in support
of his candidacy.
Plaintiffs, with Congressman Metcalfe's support, brought the matter
before the court. A hearing was held during which the coercive conduct
of the City was described. The City and one of its officials, Michael
Cardilli (later Chairman of the Chicago Transit Authority) were held in
contempt. This holding was affirmed on appeal.
22
21. Judgment at para. H.




Several other systemic violations of the decree involving political co-
ercion of employees by work supervisors have similarly resulted in con-
tempt findings. Over 100 individual enforcement actions have been filed
with the district court by employees claiming that they were fired for
political reasons. More individual complaints have been settled before
reaching court. These numerous enforcement actions, and the potential
for findings of contempt, have now substantially reduced the number of
political firings of employees whose positions are covered by the decree.
The 1972 decree has effectively prevented overtly political firings be-
cause the discharged worker has a strong incentive to enforce the decree.
Where the firing is overtly political in nature, there is a good chance that
the fired worker can be successful. Similarly, public employers know
that political firing is forbidden and generally no longer fire employees in
substantial numbers for overtly political reasons.
It also seems clear, however, that the 1972 decree has not eliminated
coercion of employees altogether. When political hiring remains the
rule, governmental employers have incentive to make patronage jobs
available for new hires. Thus, governmental "reorganizations" may re-
sult in letting existing employees go, with the way being made open to
hire new and politically sponsored employees. Discovering and proving
political motivation in these situations may be difficult. And, when pa-
tronage employees are exempt from procedural protections against arbi-
trary discharge, as they often are in Cook County, employees are
necessarily less apt to assert political independence, regardless of the con-
sent decree.
The decree, with its reliance on individual action for enforcement
also is less effective against employment decisions other than firings. A
firing situation is likely to involve facts concerning a single employee.
Promotions, on the other hand (which, under the decree, also cannot be
politically affected), may well involve preferences among employees or
between present employees and job applicants. An enforcement action
challenging politically motivated promotions might well require explora-
tion of facts relating to many persons.
An employee who is appointed through the sponsorship of a party
official and who wishes to get ahead in the job may well conclude that the
better part of wisdom is to continue to contribute-financial support or
precinct work-to the party organization. Indeed, as the late Mayor
Harold Washington testified:
As you know, the system provides to a great extent that those who do
political work will be given favoritism in terms of appointments to City
positions from the lowest kind of occupation on up to Superintendents,
1988]
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Commissioners, et cetera, and so forth. And, in turn, obviously and
clearly, it is well known, visited upon those City employees are certain
pressures that they contribute to the political campaigns of Democratic
politicians, and that they also work within the vineyards of politics in
the precincts, wards and so forth. This is known; this is the glue that,
in a sense, ties the Party together, and this is the anachronism which
has made the City of Chicago a distinct political entity throughout the
world, good or bad.
23
While the 1972 consent decree does not fully eliminate coercion of
patronage employees, its political effect is substantial. The most potent
aspect of state power, the power openly to compel political support, is
forbidden. Defendant Cook County officers have, in various court pa-
pers, referred to the 1972 decree as causing a "revolution" in politics in
Illinois and Cook County. While this characterization may be hyper-
bole, there is no doubt that the decree has had a significant impact on the
electoral process. The decree has loosened or undone the control of
party organizations over public employees. This added freedom has been
most noticeable in areas where party, ward or township organizations
were less strongly organized. In a number of black wards, the regular
Democratic organization is not a dominant force.
However, the decree has by no means completely eliminated the
political effect of the patronage employment system. A significant polit-
ical advantage obviously accrues to the officially favored party organiza-
tion when hiring continues to be based on active political support for its
candidates. That is, after all, the principal purpose of such a system.
The favored party organization's ability to grant jobs to those who ac-
tively support it provides a political advantage to that organization's can-
didates with a corresponding disadvantage to competing candidates
whose supporters have no opportunity for such employment. As one
Democratic Ward Committeeman put it, if we can't hire on the basis of
patronage, "we might as well move to Florida."
D. Case Law Development
After the entry of the 1972 decree and before the conclusion of the
litigation on the "reserved" hiring issue, two important Supreme Court
decisions gave additional support to plaintiffs' case. In Buckley v.
Valeo,24 which upheld federal funding for presidential elections, the
Court held that the government may not show favoritism in the sphere of
23. Record at 25.
24. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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electoral campaigning. 25 And in Elrod v. Burns,26 the Court not only
held that patronage firing abridges the constitutional rights of employees,
but that the practice also impairs equal protection in the political pro-
cess. The Court, closely following the amicus brief filed on Mr.
Shakman's behalf, stated:
It is not only belief and association which are restricted where political
patronage is the practice. The free functioning of the electoral process
also suffers. Conditioning public employment on partisan support pre-
vents support of competing political interests. Existing employees are
deterred from such support, as well as the multitude seeking jobs. As
government employment, state or federal, becomes more pervasive, the
greater the dependence on it becomes, and therefore the greater be-
comes the power to starve political opposition by commanding parti-
san support, financial and otherwise. Patronage thus tips the electoral
process in favor of the incumbent party, and where the practice's scope
is substantial relative to the size of the electorate, the impact on the
process can be significant.
27
III. THE HIRING CASE
After the consent decree was entered in 1972, plaintiffs sought relief
with respect to the remaining key issue-the lawfulness of defendants'
practice of conditioning hiring for patronage jobs upon political support
of the officially favored party organization. Plaintiffs also sought injunc-
tive relief with regard to the patronage practices of various other defend-
ants, such as Sheriff Elrod and the Chicago Park District, that had not
entered into the consent decree. The basic facts of the matter were not
disputed. In a series of extensive stipulations and responses to requests
to admit facts, defendants described in detail the patronage system by
which hiring for many thousands of jobs was conditioned upon regular
Democratic political sponsorship. Defendants admitted what was com-
monplace knowledge in Chicago (but would be remarkable in most cit-
ies), that hiring for most jobs in Cook County government and for most
civilian jobs with the City of Chicago was based on active political sup-
port for candidates of the regular Democratic party organization. In
most cases, persons who had in any open way actively supported compet-
ing candidates were excluded from consideration for those patronage
jobs. Defendants admitted that in many cases even the existence of job
openings was kept secret, except from party officials who provided the
job applicants.
25. Id. at 33-35, 98-99.
26. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
27. Id. at 356.
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Overall, defendants admitted that there were over 20,000 Demo-
cratic patronage jobs in Cook County. Defendants also admitted that the
purpose and effect of the patronage employment system was to give can-
didates for public office of the regular Democratic organization an electo-
ral advantage over competing candidates and voters. Plaintiffs submitted
affidavits of leading political scientists and political organizers attesting
to the fact that the precinct work produced by patronage provides a sig-
nificant electioneering advantage. Indeed, it was stated that in many lo-
cal elections, especially party primary elections, where no racial factors
are involved and where there is no great media attention (such as elec-
tions for alderman or state legislator), precinct work is the most signifi-
cant factor in determining electoral outcomes.
On the basis of these admissions and affidavits, plaintiffs moved for
partial summary judgment on defendants' liability with respect to pa-
tronage hiring practices, and for injunctive relief on the firing issue as to
nonconsenting defendants. Defendants did not contend that politically
conditioned hiring was lawful. Rather, they argued that the 1972 decree
had effectively ended the overwhelming political dominance of the regu-
lar Democratic organization. They contended that relief was thus not
needed for the remaining patronage hiring practices, and it was suggested
that such relief would overly intrude into local governmental operations.
In an extensive opinion, Judge Nicholas Bua (to whom the case had
been reagsigned) granted plaintiffs' motion as to liability. 28 His scholarly
opinion described in detail the workings of the patronage hiring system.
He concluded that the system at issue was so extensive that it put in-
dependent candidates and voters at a substantial electoral disadvantage
to the officially favored candidates of the regular Democratic party or-
ganization. He concluded that this denied plaintiffs the equal protection
of the law in that the power of the state was used to grant one political
faction an electoral advantage over competing candidates and voters.
Judge Bua further concluded that the system deprived plaintiffs of their
first amendment rights of speech and association. The patronage system
created a classification based on the content of political speech, he held,
and used the power of the state to disadvantage candidates and voters
with disfavored views and exclude those who would associate with plain-
tiffs from doing so if they wished to retain their opportunity for
employment.
After the court of appeals denied defendants' leave to appeal the
district court's decision on an interlocutory basis, and after attempts to
28. 481 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
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settle the case were unsuccessful, Judge Bua held an evidentiary hearing
on the nature of relief to be entered. Plaintiffs submitted that simple
injunctive relief, similar to the 1972 decree, would be insufficient. Be-
cause individual enforcement actions on hiring claims would be less
likely than actions on discharge claims, plaintiffs submitted that an en-
forcement mechanism was needed which did not depend on individual
claims. At the same time, plaintiffs and the court did not wish to sup-
plant the management discretion of the defendant governmental employ-
ers with judicial supervision.
A. The Nature of the Hiring Relief
In early 1983, the district court entered final judgment on the hiring
issue. The court's judgment had an interesting structure. Like the 1972
decree, the 1983 hiring judgment contained a concisely worded injunc-
tion against "conditioning, basing or knowingly prejudicing or affecting
the hiring of any person as a Government Employee upon or because of
any political reason or factor," except with respect to the exempted posi-
tions. Unlike the 1972 consent decree, however, the 1983 hiring decree
was not dependent on individual enforcement actions by affected voters
(although such enforcement actions were specifically allowed). 29 With
respect to hiring matters, defendants were required to take various af-
firmative steps to bring themselves into compliance with the basic injunc-
tive requirement. These affirmative steps carefully avoided judicial
intrusion into local governmental management.
Each defendant public employer bound by the decree was required
to develop and implement a plan of compliance. 30 The plan had to de-
scribe in detail the method of hiring to be followed by the employer, and
state the hiring criteria for various positions as well as a selection method
which excludes all political factors. The decree gave the defendant em-
ployers complete discretion to adopt any hiring plan they wished, and to
change plans, as long as the hiring method prevented political factors
from influencing hiring decisions. No court approval of a plan or plan
amendment was required. A plan was to be presented to the court for
ruling only if a party asked the court to find that the plan failed to com-
29. It appears that, as of this writing, only one individual has brought a hiring enforcement
action.
30. The concept of a compliance plan was made common in desegregation litigation. It is a
device by which a public defendant, which is presumed to be willing to change its behavior, is dele-
gated the power in the first instance to conform its activity to judicial requirements. In some cases
defendant public officers may have a right to suggest a plan of compliance before any relief is ordered
by the court. See, e.g., United States v. Board of Educ., 717 F;2d 378 (7th Cir. 1983), on appeal from
remand, 744 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1984).
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ply with the provisions of the decree. Thus, the decree allows complete
management control over employment to remain in the hands of the de-
fendant public employers. Defendants are also required to give public
notice of the availability of job openings.
31
Shortly after Judge Bua entered final judgment in 1983, a number of
important public employers entered into consent decrees concerning
political hiring. These defendants included the City of Chicago, the Chi-
cago Park District, and the Sheriff, the Treasurer and the Clerk of the
Circuit Court of Cook County. (The Cook County State's Attorney had
entered into a hiring consent decree before the entry of the 1983 judg-
ment.) Together, these consenting defendants employ about 55,000 em-
ployees. The various consent judgments state that they are entered into
for two independent reasons: to provide plaintiffs with relief for their
claims that the patronage hiring system violated their constitutional
rights, and also to enforce and carry out the 1972 decree.
B. Plans of Compliance
The consent decrees followed the pattern of the court's judgment in
that they required the defendant governmental employers to adopt a plan
of compliance. The final plans (adopted after considerable delay) are in-
teresting in their approaches. Most of the defendant public employers
avoided adopting or expanding civil service-type procedures with com-
petitive examinations. The City of Chicago, for example, adopted a de-
tailed plan in which hiring is bifurcated between the personnel
department and the various hiring departments. This method was se-
lected both because of its administrative advantage to the City and be-
cause it meant that collusion between two departments would be
necessary to violate the injunction. The City's plan also contains an in-
teresting device for judicial relief. The plan calls for an annual audit by
an independent auditor to determine whether the City is in compliance
both with the substantive provisions of the decree and with the require-
ments of its plan.
On the whole, the City's system (which, it may be emphasized, was
its choice and was not developed by the court) appears to have worked
well. The City believes that it has improved the overall quality of its
workforce with no appreciable administrative burden. It also reports
that the decree has eliminated racial discrimination which was part and
31. The history of enforcement under the hiring decree has been one of very limited court
involvement. The most dramatic involvement came in 1985 when the court, frustrated with lengthy
delays in the City's development of a plan, ordered a freeze on nonemergency city hiring until princi-
ples governing a plan were adopted.
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parcel of the patronage-based employment system. The first independent
audit report of the City's compliance concluded that, although record-
keeping in various respects needed to be improved, there was no substan-
tial evidence of patronage hiring.
32
These achievements are no minor matter. Defendants' implementa-
tion of the decree has reduced dramatically the degree of coercion placed
on new hires; it has improved the overall quality of hiring, and has dra-
matically reduced the extent to which city employment practices give an
improper electioneering advantage to a favored political faction. Indeed,
as the City's long-time Personnel Director has stated:
At the time I left my position as Commissioner of Personnel in 1985,
the City was hiring, in general, more highly qualified employees than it
was prior to the hiring consent decree. Among the reasons for this are:
(i) The decree requires broader public notice of jobs to be
given. This results in a larger pool of applicants and consequently
allows a better choice for selection.
(ii) Many qualified persons, who otherwise would not have
been interested in City jobs, were interested in and applied for
those jobs because they believed that the jobs would not be condi-
tioned on political support and other non-merit factors.
33
C. Electoral Effect
The effects of the two decrees in opening up the electoral system are,
of course, difficult to measure with precision. There have been numerous
independent trends in Chicago politics since the time the case was
brought. Mayor Daley is gone from the scene and his political successors
have not all been as politically skilled. Television has become a more
important campaign factor in elections for visible offices. And the devel-
opment of the black vote as a potent political force has had a dramatic
influence on elections. Indeed, city politics has begun to revolve around
race.3
4
Nonetheless, it seems clear that the decrees in Shakman have been
especially influential in opening up the political process in Cook County.
The new freedom of public employees from political coercion has been
instrumental in allowing black voters to elect Mayor Washington and to
32. Plans adopted by other consenting defendants utilize a variety of hiring methods, ranging
from competitive examinations to systems similar to that of the City. Independent audits are also
required.
33. Affidavit of Dr. Charles A. Pounion.
34. The fact that politics has to an extent begun to revolve around race has meant that the use
of patronage now has strong racial overtones. For example, white ethnic or Republican candidates,
whose political constituencies do not generally include blacks, are extremely unlikely to use pa-
tronage to hire black employees.
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secure an independent political identity. It may also give them freedom
not to elect Acting Mayor Sawyer. Indeed, mayoral elections are now
widely competitive.
The best evidence of the effect of the case, however, may be seen in
elections where there is not much television attention and where race is
not a dividing line. Here, there has been a dramatic increase in political
competition. For example, elections for the Chicago City Council are
now vigorously contested and there are strong minority factions in the
City Council. The members of the County Board elected from the city of
Chicago no longer are automatically those slated by the party organiza-
tion. Of the ten city members on the County Board, at least three are
independent candidates (not endorsed by a party organization in the pri-
mary). Ward committee elections have become much more competitive.
And elections for judges, which party organization candidates never lost
in the 1960s, have been won by many nonorganization candidates.
In short, Cook County politics has been transformed from the prov-
ince of a single centralized party apparatus to a hearty, competitive,
sometimes chaotic and swirling process-Chicago's version of glasnost.
In short, the decrees in Shakman have been dramatically successful. Pa-
tronage hiring, where it continues to be allowed, remains a forceful ele-
ment of political advantage. But it is no longer so substantial an
advantage that politics is made wholly uncompetitive. Thus, the
Shakman case is one of the best examples available of systemic reform
litigation, having achieved dramatic success with a minimum of judicial
intervention in local political processes.
IV. THE SECOND DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
Various defendant public employers-the President of the Cook
County Board, the County Clerk, the County Assessor and the County's
alter ego, its Forest Preserve District, did not agree to end patronage
hiring but instead appealed the decision of the district court. The Demo-
cratic Party County Central Committee joined in that appeal.
The general context in which the appeal was presented for consider-
ation was, of course, much different than when the case was first heard
by the court of appeals in 1970. The 1972 consent decree had been suffi-
ciently successful in making Chicago and Cook County politics competi-
tive, so that the urgency of judicial relief with respect to patronage hiring
may have seemed less apparent. Moreover, although through the history
of the litigation the court had not interfered with local governmental ac-
tivities, such interference was plainly more of a possibility in the hiring
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context. The Seventh Circuit, which had become markedly more con-
servative since 1970, was not inclined toward judicial action that would
involve the regulation of local government activities.
Also, the legal framework with regard to standing had been ex-
pressed by the United States Supreme Court in cases after 1970 in a
somewhat more elaborate fashion. In 1970, the leading authority on
standing was Baker v. Carr.35 The Court in Baker described standing as
the requirement that served to ensure that there be a case or controversy
by focusing on whether the parties had alleged a sufficient personal stake
in the outcome so as to present a concretely adversarial case. More re-
cently, the Supreme Court has generally applied the standing doctrine to
constrain the role of the judiciary. In Allen v. Wright,36 the Court elabo-
rated on the formulation of standing by expressing the additional require-
ment that the complained of injury must be fairly traceable to
defendant's conduct and be able to be redressed by the requested relief.
The difference between the formulations in Baker v. Carr and in Al-
len v. Wright is not entirely evident. If there is no causality or availabil-
ity of effective relief, there is no real personal stake in the outcome.
However, the Court's emphasis on the traceability of injury seems to
have been utilized by lower courts seeking to limit the scope of their
review by concluding that an injury is not sufficiently traceable to allow
judicial action.
In August, 1987, a new panel of the Seventh Circuit, relying on the
Supreme Court's decision in Allen, reversed the 1983 hiring judgment
against the nonconsenting defendants. 37 Despite the court's 1970 ruling
which upheld plaintiffs' standing, the 1987 panel held that plaintiffs had
no standing to pursue the hiring claim by itself. The court emphasized,
however, that the district court did have jurisdiction to enforce the 1972
consent decree.
The court of appeals concluded that the 1970 standing decision was
no longer binding because of the Supreme Court's subsequent modifica-
tion of the requirements for standing, and because the 1970 decision did
not consider the patronage hiring practices alone. The panel essentially
held that, regardless of the allegations of the complaint, electoral injury
to officially disfavored candidates could not be traced with sufficient cer-
tainty to patronage hiring as a matter of law. The decision noted that
jobs could be promised equally to supporters of any contender for office,
35. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
36. 468 U.S. 737 (1984). See also Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464. 472 (1982).
37. 829 F.2d 1387 (7th Cir. 1987).
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should he win. This, of course, is of little significance in a patronage
system where many elections are for positions which have no jobs to dis-
pense, and where the system involves hiring by numerous public employ-
ers. The court's argument seems to give little weight to the effect the
system may have in reducing support for disfavored candidates.
The court found allegations of the political effect of patronage hiring
to be speculative. It also found that the patronage employees' decisions
to support the incumbent party faction were independent decisions (even
though required to get a job). In short, the court chose to avoid a deci-
sion on the substantive constitutional issues by concluding that plaintiffs
did not have standing even though it must be observed that it is precisely
candidates and voters who are the largest victims of patronage systems
and not the employees who are merely the pawns of the game. Plainly,
the court used the discretion implied in the standing doctrine to avoid
expanding judicial authority over local governmental operations.
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case on February 22,
1988.38 The City of Chicago subsequently filed a motion to vacate the
hiring consent decree but has agreed now to withdraw that motion.
Thus, the hiring consent decree remains in place as to the most signifi-
cant defendant.
V. CONCLUSION
Consent decrees remain in place which forbid defendants from plac-
ing political pressure on persons once hired as public employees. These
decrees cover well over 100,000 employees. Consent decrees also remain
in place which forbid political hiring and cover about 60,000 employees.
As a result, the case thus constitutes one of the most far reaching and
significant uses of the courts to achieve effective relief from a long-stand-
ing constitutional violation.
38. 108 S. Ct. 1026 (1988).
[Vol. 64:479
